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I. Introduction
In 2007, a law professor at Keio University, who was also a member of the 
Japanese bar examination committee, was accused of leaking the contents 
of the bar exam during his class lectures1 The incident was said to have 
caused a substantial increase in the pass rate of Keio law graduates that year. 
The resulting scandal led to removal of the accused professor from the bar 
examination committee and his resignation from Keio University.2 Later that 
year, to prevent similar occurrences the Japanese Ministry of Justice announced 
new rules governing conduct of the bar examination committee.3
The incident is unprecedented in legal education in Japan. But it is only 
one example of numerous unforeseen problems encountered since the legal 
education system was reformed in 2004. Changes centered on formation 
of graduate-level “Houkadaigakuin” (professional law schools), which are 
similar to law schools in the United States but admit students with both law 
and non-law backgrounds.4 In 2009, South Korea also established a model 
1. Eiji Yamamura, Introduction of the new bar examination and the changing effect of 
influential professors on its outcomes: The case of Japan 2006–2009, MPRA Paper No. 
21371, at 3 (2010), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21371/1/MPRA_paper_21371.
pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 8.
4. See, e.g., Mayumi Saegusa, Why the Japanese Law School System was Established: Co-
optation as a Defensive Tactic in the Face of Global Pressures, 34 Law & Soc. Inquiry 
365, 366–67 (2009); see also Annelise Riles & Takashi Uchida, Reforming Knowledge? A 
Socio-legal Critique of the Legal Education Reforms in Japan, 1 Drexel L. Rev. 3, 12 (2009), 
available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/37/.
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similar to American-style legal education.5 Under the new systems in Japan 
and Korea, only graduates of new law schools are eligible to take the national 
bar exams.6 The major difference between the two systems is that Korea tightly 
controls the number of new law schools and law students and has a 70 percent 
or higher pass rate on its bar exam, while in Japan the number of law schools 
is more than expected and the pass rate remains lower than 40 percent.7
Implementation of the American model of legal education has led to 
fierce debate. Supporters of the reforms claim that the introduction of the 
Socratic Method, interactive teaching and clinical education will considerably 
strengthen the professional skills of the next generation of attorneys.8 
However, critics maintain that the constraints related to the bar exam pass rate 
have turned the new law schools into cram schools.9 The pass rates are viewed 
as a bottleneck for those who want to enter the legal profession and a major 
obstacle to reforms.10 The exam’s content and test methodology, however, 
appear to have aroused less comment.
At least two books on legal education in East Asia have included the 
Taiwanese system in the same category with those of Japan and Korea.11 But 
will Taiwan follow in the footsteps of Japan and Korea? Even more important: 
Is the American model the gold standard for legal education in East Asian 
countries?12 Or should Taiwan insist on changes?
At the beginning of the 21st century, academic discussion and government 
studies on legal education reform in Taiwan have focused mainly on the 
5. Matthew J. Wilson, U.S. Legal Education Methods and Ideals: Application to the Japanese 
and Korean Systems, 18 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 295, 337–40 (2010).
6. Id. at 318–19, 340.
7. Id. at 326–27, 339–40. 
8. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy et. al., Building Clinical Legal Education Programs in a Country 
without a Tradition of Graduate Professional Legal Education: Japan Educational Reform 
as a Case Study, 13 Clinical L. Rev. 417, 420–21 (2006); Wilson, supra note 5, at 305; see also 
Noboru Kashiwagi, Creation of Japanese Law Schools and Their Current Development, in 
Legal Education in Asia: Globalization, Change and Contexts, 185, 192–93 (Stacey Steele & 
Kathryn Taylor eds., Routledge Press 2010). 
9. Wilson, supra note 5, at 328–29; see also Charles R. Irish, Reflections on the Evolution of Law 
and Legal Education in China and Vietnam, 25 Wis. Int’l L. J. 243, 244 (2007).
10. Wilson, supra note 5, at 326–29.
11. See, e.g., William Alford, Introduction to Raising the Bar: the Emerging Legal Profession in 
East Asia 3 (William Alford ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2007); Stacey Steele & Kathryn Taylor, 
Introduction to Legal Education in Asia: Globalization, Change and Contexts, supra note 8, 
at 10–11.
12. American Bar Association, Report of Special Committee on Foreign Law Schools Seeking 
Approval under ABA Standards 4, July 19 2010, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/
legaled/accreditation/kanereportinternational%20(2).doc.
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experiences of Japan and Korea.13 Since 1999, countless conferences have invited 
foreign scholars to discuss legal education reform in their countries.14 Although 
scholars in Taiwan have yet to reach a consensus on the ideal model, most agree 
that the current system is problematic.15 In 2006 and 2007, the government 
proposed two reform schemes,16 both resembling reforms undertaken in Japan 
and Korea. Both schemes adopt the American post-undergraduate training 
system and permit only graduates of the newly designated professional schools 
to take the bar examination.17 One controversial issue in the two proposals is 
raising the bar exam pass rate by limiting the number of students (probably 
fewer than 700) admitted to the new professional law schools. Because of 
resistance from legal academia, neither of the proposals has been adopted.18
This paper argues that several often ignored differences between the system 
in Taiwan and the pre-reform systems in Japan and Korea—particularly the 
separation of examinations for judicial officers and lawyers—suggest that 
Taiwan should follow a different path. In the last decade, while legal education 
in Japan and Korea has become similar to American-style law schools, Taiwan 
has been developing more diversified tracks and institutions, including 
graduate law institutes that admit students for professional education without 
undergraduate degrees in law. Although Taiwan also has cram schools, 
inefficiency in the legal education system is less the result of low bar exam 
pass rates than the politics in legal academia—a problem unlikely to be solved 
simply by adopting the reform models of Japan and Korea. Although new 
rules related to national professional admission exams went into effect in 
2011, these rules are likely to exacerbate, rather than resolve, old problems. 
Furthermore, because the Judge Act of 2011 encourages the selection of 
judges and prosecutors from experienced lawyers rather than from young, 
inexperienced law school graduates without much social experience, we can 
expect that a distinct new educational route will evolve. In the new system, a 
graduate-level law degree might become necessary and American-style schools 
at the graduate-level might be established. However, law schools which train 
lawyers in a diverse range of specialties are likely to be preserved.
This article is divided into four parts. First it compares the major 
characteristics of the current structure of legal education in Taiwan with the 
13. Tay-Sheng Wang, The Development of Legal Education in Taiwan: An Analysis of 
the History of Law and Society, in Legal Education in Asia: Globalization, Change and 
Contexts, supra note 8, at 137, 146.
14. Id.
15. Taiwan ge daxue falü xiangguan xisuo zhuguan zhendui erlinglingqi nian siyue shiba ri 
guonei faxue jiaoyu biange gongtinghui fabiao xinwengao (The persons in charge of law-
related departments in Taiwan, press release in connection with the public hearing on 
legal education reform held on Apr. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Legal Education Reform Press 
Release], available at http://justice.nccu.edu.tw/News/news_view.asp?id=155.
16. Wang, supra note 13, at 146–49.
17. Id. at 146–48.
18. Id. at 148–49.
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pre-reform systems in Japan and Korea. Second, it analyzes the structure of 
the professional admission exams and the arguments provided in support of 
this approach. Third, it explains why reform efforts between 2005 and 2007, 
based on reforms in Japan and Korea, were unsuccessful. Fourth, it discusses 
several important actions since 2007, particularly the new dual-exam model 
adopted in 2011, which will shape legal education in Taiwan.
II. Similarities and Differences: Pre-reform Systems in Japan and Korea
1. Two Gates and Two Tracks
Taiwanese legal education looks similar to that in Japan and Korea before 
their recent reforms: undergraduate study of law, a national admission 
licensing exam and pre-practice training at a central government institute.19 
Nonetheless, there remain several important differences between the system in 
Taiwan and those of the other two countries. These differences make pressure 
for reform in Taiwan weaker than it was in Japan or Korea.
First, unlike the pre-reform systems in Japan and Korea, law schools in 
Taiwan are the only path for those wishing to become judges, prosecutors and 
lawyers,20 since a law degree is required to take the professional admission 
exams.21 This not only makes the pool of applicants smaller than that of Japan 
19. Mayumi Saegusa, supra note 4, at 370; see also Masako Kamiya, Structural and Institutional 
Arrangements of Legal Education: Japan, 24 Wis. Int’l L. J. 153 (2006); Sang-Hyun Song, 
the Education and Training of the Legal Profession in Korea: Problems and Prospects for 
Reform, in Raising the Bar: the Emerging Legal Profession in East Asia, supra note 11, at 
23, 23–33; For information about legal education in Taiwan in earlier years, see Hundgah 
Chiu & Jyh-pin Fa, Taiwan’s Legal System and Legal Profession 13–14 (Occasional 









20. In the pre-reform systems of both Japan and Korea, regulations governing the judicial exams 
required no background in legal education, though in reality a great number of students 
aiming to become lawyers entered undergraduate law departments. Wilson, supra note 5, at 
317.; see also Jae Won Kim, Legal Profession and Legal Culture during Korea’s Transition to 
Democracy and a Market Economy, in Raising the Bar: the Emerging Legal Profession in 
East Asia, supra note 11, at 68.
21. However, before Regulations Governing Certification Tests were abolished in 2008, people 
who did not have a college degree could take a certification test to qualify for the bar exam. 
See Zhuanmen zhiye ji jishu renyuan gaodeng kaoshi lushi kaoshi guize (Regulations 
of professional and technical staff higher examination of bar exam), art. 5, subsec. 4 
(2009) [hereinafter Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations], available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/
LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=R0040047. The certification test required the applicants 
to be older than 22 years. See Jianding kaoshi guize [Regulations Governing Certification 
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or Korea, but also establishes the education of law professionals as the primary 
mission of law schools in Taiwan, despite the fact that the low pass rate means 
that most law graduates do not become practitioners.
Second, the size of Taiwan’s undergraduate classes is generally smaller 
(usually not more than 200 and often fewer than 100 students) than those in 
Japan or Korea and perhaps even smaller than those of some mid-size J.D. 
programs in the United States. This is because the Ministry of Education 
stringently controls the student-teacher ratio in public and private 
universities.22 The ratio limit for undergraduate law departments is 25 to 1 
and is 12 to 1 for graduate institutes.23 A student-teacher ratio of 25 to 1 might 
be considered too high,24 in comparison with the 20 to 1 standard set by the 
American Bar Association for accredited law schools.25 However, this figure 
is much closer to the American standard than those found in many European 
countries, such as Germany, in which class enrollment often exceeds 1,000 
students with a student-teacher ratio exceeding 100 to 1.26 More than 500 
students in a single classroom, as can be found in some Japanese undergraduate 
law programs,27 is a situation that has never existed in Taiwan.
The lower student-teacher ratio means that gaining admission to 
undergraduate law programs in Taiwan is more difficult than it is in many 
European nations. Because a law degree provides opportunities for higher 
income and greater prestige compared with other disciplines in the social 
sciences, admission to undergraduate law programs in Taiwan has become as 
Tests], art. 3 (abolished in 2008), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.
aspx?PCode=R0050001. Since most college students graduate at or after 22, few bar exam 
takers choose this approach.
22. With respect to the guideline for student-teacher ratios in higher education, see zhuanke 
yishang xuexiao zongliang fazhan guimo yu ziyuan tiaojian biaozhun (Standards of Total 
Develop Scale and Resource Conditions for Schools of Higher Education), available at 
http://edu.law.moe.gov.tw/LawContent.aspx?id=FL049460.
23. Id. at appendix 1.
24. Chang-fa Lo, Driving An Ox Cart to Catch Up with the Space Shuttle: the Need for and 
Prospects of Legal Education Reform in Taiwan, 24 Wis. Int’l L. J. 41, 51 (2006).
25. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, Ch. 
4, Interpretation 402-1 (2011–2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2011_2012_aba_standards_chapter4.
authcheckdam.pdf.
26. Mark E. Steiner, Cram Schooled, 24 Wis. Int’l L. J. 377, 378 (2006).
27. E.g., Yoshiharu Kawabata, The Reform of Legal Education and Training in Japan: Problems 
and Prospects, 43 S. Tex. L. Rev. 419, 432 (2002). In Japan, there are nearly 100 undergraduate 
law faculties, with approximately 200,000 students in 2008. See Setsuo Miyazawa et al., The 
Reform of Legal Education in East Asia, 4 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 333, 340 (2008), available 
at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.3.081806.112713. In 
Taiwan, some law departments might have classes with more than 300 students. But this is 
not a common situation. See Lo, supra note 24, at 60.
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competitive as at American J.D. programs. Since the 1990s, law has ranked as 
the top choice for college applicants in the social sciences and the humanities.28 
The third difference is that during the last two decades, many universities 
have established graduate law institutes that admit students with non-
law undergraduate backgrounds. This second gateway to the study of 
law is designed to meet the growing social demand for legal services on 
interdisciplinary matters. A student in these graduate institutes usually must 
obtain 80 to 100 credits in three academic years to earn a master’s degree.29 
The success of these J.D.-like graduate institutes was an important reason for 
opposition to reforms during 2005 and 2007.
The fourth and perhaps most important difference between the system in 
Taiwan and those found in Japan or Korea is that Taiwan has two tracks for 
professional admission examinations and pre-practice training.30 The national 
exam for the selection of judges or public prosecutors (the Judicial Officer 
Exam) is separate from the exam for licensing lawyers (the bar exam), 31 and 
the pre-practice training for those who pass the two exams is separate as well. 
Individuals who pass the judicial exam enter the Judges and Prosecutors 
Training Institute for pre-practice training.32 At the end of that training, they 
must qualify to become judges or prosecutors.33 Other individuals who pass 
the bar exam enter the Lawyers Training Institute.34
Although the two training institutes are both run by the Ministry of 
Justice,35 the resources assigned to them are significantly disproportionate. 
28. Joseph L. Pratt, The Two Gates of National Taiwan University School of Law, 19 UCLA 
Pac. Basin L. J. 131, 151 (2001).
29. But because their diploma is a master’s degree, the Ministry of Education requires that these 
students must write a master’s thesis, which often makes their course of study longer than 
three years. See Wang, supra note 13, at 142.
30. Lo, supra note 24, at 64; see also Pratt, supra note 28, at 153–56.
31. For the development of admission to the bar, see Jane Kaufman Winn, The Role of Lawyers 
in Taiwan’s Emerging Democracy, in Raising the Bar: the Emerging Legal Profession in East 
Asia, supra note 11, at 368, 368–69.
32. See Sifa renyuan renshi tiaoli (Judicial Personnel Regulations), art. 27 (2007), available 
at http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=S0020049. For a general 
introduction on judges and prosecutors in Taiwan, see Chiu & Fa, supra note 19, at 13.
33. See Fawubu sifaguan xunlian suo sifaguan xunlian guize (Training Institute For Judges and 
Prosecutors, Ministry of Justice—Regulations of training for judges and prosecutors), art. 20 
(2011) [hereinafter Regulations of training for judges and prosecutors], available at http://law.
moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0010008.
34. See Regulations Governing Pre-Service Training for Attorneys, art. 4 (2009), available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0020012.
35. See id. at art. 5; Fawubu sifaguan xunliansuo zuzhi tiaolì (Training Institute For Judges and 
Prosecutors, Ministry of Justice—Organization regulations), art. 10 (1980), available at http://
law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=I0000002. Though authority for lawyer 
training is in the hands of the Ministry of Justice, the ministry delegates that authority to the 
Taiwan Bar Association, to which all local bars belong.
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The training for judges and prosecutors takes as much as two years and 
trainees are considered public servants, receiving an allowance during their 
training period.36 The training includes classroom lectures on practical skills 
and on-site apprenticeship in district courts, the offices of district prosecutors, 
administrative agencies and law firms.37 The institute assigns apprenticeship 
opportunities for trainees.38 Test results from lectures and evaluations performed 
during the apprenticeships are taken into account when determining whether 
a trainee is to become a judge or a prosecutor, and to which jurisdiction he or 
she will be assigned after graduation. In short, this institute is similar to the 
Legal Training and Research Institute in Japan and the Judicial Research and 
Training Institute in Korea,39 except that the training in the Taiwan institute 
is not for lawyers.
Conversely, the free training provided by the Lawyer Training Institute lasts 
only one month and offers no on-site practice.40 Trainees are not considered 
public servants and receive no allowance. In addition to the training, a five-
month apprenticeship under the supervision of a senior attorney who has 
practiced for more than five years is required before a student may join a local 
bar.41 However, unlike the trainees in the Judges and Prosecutors Training 
Institute, prospective lawyers must locate supervisors themselves.42 In the 
wake of the 2008 economic recession, the increased numbers of lawyers and 
a decline in the number of apprenticeship opportunities have made it more 
difficult for trainee lawyers to find supervisors. Considering the pre-practice 
training available in Japan and Korea, lawyers in Taiwan are less well trained 
before joining local bars.43 The reason behind the separation of training tracks 
for judicial officers and lawyers is that a government subsidy to train lawyers 
is considered inappropriate because lawyers primarily pursue the interests of 
their clients and not the public.44
36. See Regulations of training for judges and prosecutors, supra note 33, at art. 9–10. It is similar 
in Korea and Japan during the pre-reform periods. See Kim, supra note 20, at 51. 
37. See Regulations of training for judges and prosecutors, supra note 33, at art. 10.
38. Id.
39. Wilson, supra note 5, at 316; Song, supra note 19, at 33–35; Kim, supra note 20, at 51.
40. Regulations Governing Pre-Service Training for Attorneys, art. 5 (2009).
41. Id. at art. 9 (2009).
42. Id.
43. Similarly separated paths and training existed in Japan before World War II. Two exams, 
one for judges and prosecutors and one for lawyers, existed until 1923. Even after the two 
exams were combined into one (those who passed all stages of the exam became judges 
or prosecutors, while others who did not pass the final stage but passed all other stages 
became lawyers), the separate practical training persisted in Japan until 1947. Before 1936, 
no apprenticeship time was required to become a Japanese lawyer. See Sabrina Shizue 
McKenna, Proposal for Judicial Reform in Japan: An Overview, 2 Asian Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 
20, 122, 125 (2001).
44. Similar opinions appeared in Korea. See Song, supra note 19, at 34.
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2. The Effect of the Two-Track System
The separate tracks influence the judicial system in three ways. First, unlike 
the systems in Japan and Korea, the annual passing quota of the Judicial 
Officer Exam is not calculated according to the capacity of the Judges and 
Prosecutors Training Institute, but according to demands for new judges 
and prosecutors requested by the Judicial Yuan (the highest judicial organ 
in Taiwan) and the Ministry of Justice.45 Because the number of trainees in 
the institute is close to the demand for manpower, all trainees usually qualify 
as judges or prosecutors.46 Because the selection of prospective judges and 
prosecutors is made, not at the end of their institute training as in Japan or 
Korea,47 but before training, the Judicial Yuan and the Ministry of Justice have 
little discretion in selection of prospective judges or prosecutors from the pool 
of trainees. The recruitment of judges and prosecutors is therefore determined 
mainly by the judicial officer exam. This process hampers the ability of 
the Judicial Yuan and the Ministry of Justice to weed out weaker trainees. 
Conversely, new judges and prosecutors in Japan and Korea are selected from 
a much larger pool based on their performance in the training process and 
many trainees become lawyers instead of judicial officers.
The second effect is a reversal in the direction of career transfer between 
judges and lawyers from the typical pattern in the United States where judges 
are selected from senior practicing lawyers. Because judges and prosecutors 
in Taiwan have life tenure, a much higher starting salary, higher social status 
and better allowances and training than lawyers, becoming a judicial officer 
is the primary goal of most law graduates. However, after they accumulate 
sufficient experience and social connections, many judges or prosecutors 
become practicing lawyers to benefit from a better practice environment and 
higher long-term income.48
The third effect is that the pass rate of the bar exam is easier to alter in 
Taiwan than in Japan or Korea because prospective lawyers are not trained 
with judicial officers and their training cost is low. The pass rate of bar exams 
in Japan and Korea was said to be less than 3 percent before the recent 
45. Pratt, supra note 28, at 155. In Korea, before 1981, a candidate who scored 40 percent or 
higher in every subject and got an average score of 60 percent or higher passed the exam. 
Since there were very few successful candidates during those years, the policy changed into 
a fixed number of candidates each year after 1981. See Song, supra note 19, at 28.
46. The total number of trainees in JPTI from 1988 to 2007 was 2,592, but only 7 trainees failed 
during this period. See Yafeng Lin, Tan minguo yilinglíng nian qi sifaguan kaoshi lushi 
kaoshi zhi xinzhi gaige (On the new systems of judicial and bar exams starting in 2011), 
National Elite, Vol.6, Issue 1, at 11 (June 2005), available at http://wwwc.moex.gov.tw/main/
Quarterly/wHandQuarterly_File.ashx?quarterly_id=176.
47. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 5, at 317–18.
48. See Heng-Wen Liu, Cong zhishi jishou yu xueke dingwei lun bainian lai taiwan faxue jiaoyu 
(From the perspectives of knowledge transplantation and discipline orientation to analyze 
the transformation of legal education in Taiwan in the last century), Ph.D. thesis, Institute 
of National Taiwan University Law, at 266–67 (2005), available at http://www.airitilibrary.
com/searchdetail.aspx?DocIDs=U0001-2407200521003900.
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reforms.49 However, of those who passed, many ended up becoming judges 
or prosecutors. Thus, the number of new lawyers in the two countries was 
actually small. In Taiwan, the early pass rate of the bar exam has not dropped 
below 5 percent since 1989.50 The reason for the difference is that the total 
number of individuals passing the exam in Taiwan is not fixed, but is based 
mainly on a fixed percentage of test-takers in any particular year. Therefore, 
the competitive pressure on individuals taking the exam in Taiwan probably is 
less than on those taking the exam in Japan or Korea.
The weaker competitive pressure in the Taiwan bar exam reduces but does 
not eliminate problems associated with low bar pass rates in Japan and Korea. 
Most students graduate from law school at the age of 22 or 23, however, the 
average age of individuals taking the bar exam is 27 and 26 for the judicial 
exam.51 Without including the one-year mandatory military service required 
of male law graduates, many individuals might have to prepare for as much 
as four to five years before passing either of the two national exams.52 As in 
Japan or Korea, many of those planning to take the exams stop working.53 
Many Taiwanese law students now begin attending cram schools in the second 
or even first year of law school.54 Instructors increasingly complain that the 
attendance (and enthusiasm) of students in lectures is decreasing, except in 
courses dealing with issues directly related to the two exams.55 The so called 
“double school phenomenon” in Japanese legal education, meaning that many 
law students simultaneously enroll in formal law schools and cram schools, 
has gradually become popular in today’s Taiwan.56
If Taiwanese authorities can raise the bar exam pass rate, regardless of the 
capacity of the training institutes, why does it not do so? Raising the pass 
rate could reduce the pressure on law school graduates to prepare for the 
49. The pre-reform system in Japan educated about 45,000 students each year, but the number 
of successful bar exam test-takers was smaller than 1,000 before 1999. See Wilson, supra note 
5, at 315–17. In Korea, from 1991 to 2002, the passage rate was never higher than 5 percent. See 
Song, supra note 19, at 29.
50. Wang, supra note 13, at 140. For detailed numbers of bar and judicial exam applicants and 
passage rates, see Lo, supra note 24, at 66–68; see also Shu-chin Grace Kuo, Rethinking the 
Masculine Character of the Legal Profession: a Case Study of Female Legal Professionals 
and Their Gendered Life in Taiwan, 13 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 25, 56–57 (2005).
51. Examination statistics, the Ministry of Examination, available at http://wwwc.moex.gov.tw/
main/ExamReport/wFrmExamStatistics.aspx?menu_id=158.
52. Hwei-Syin Chen, Toumingdu yu sifa renyuan kaoxuan zhidu zhi xingge (Transparency and 
innovation of the judicial examination & selection system), National Elite, Vol.1, Issue 2, at 
37 (June 2005), available at http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~hschen/book_summary/200506-01.
pdf.
53. Lo, supra note 24, at 68; see also Steiner, supra note 26, at 378–83.
54. Lo, supra note 24, at 68–69; see also Kim, supra note 20, at 71.
55. Pratt, supra note 28, at 158; see also Kim, supra note 20, at 51.
56. Koichiro Fujikura, Reform of Legal Education in Japan: the Creation of Law Schools 
without a Professional Sense of Mission, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 941, 944 (2001).
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exam and those wishing to become judges or prosecutors would not have 
to compete with those planning careers as litigators. Many factors hinder 
manipulation of the pass rate. The most important factor, however, is the role 
played by the Examination Yuan (a branch of government independent from 
the administration under the five-branch constitution in Taiwan, discussed 
below). The Taiwanese constitution has shaped the politics associated with 
the two exams, resulting in obstructions to reform. This issue deserves more 
detailed analysis.
III. The Politics of the Two Examinations
1. The “Failure” of Cram Schools
Cram schools dedicated to preparation for the bar exam are common in 
many countries. In the United States, most law school graduates take review 
courses from companies such as Barbri before taking the exam.57 In Germany, 
the long tradition of cram schools, the so-called Repetitorien can be traced 
back to Bologna, Italy in the 13th century.58 In Japan and Korea, more than 90 
percent of those who succeed on the exam study in cram schools.59 Students 
in Taiwan, Japan, and Korea appear to spend considerably more time in 
cram schools than those in the United States and Germany.60 This could 
be explained in part by the high bar exam pass rate (typically more than 70 
percent) in the United States and Germany.61 An alternative explanation is that 
cram schools in Taiwan, Japan, and Korea are managed less well than their 
counterparts in other countries. However, as described below, cram schools 
for other disciplines in Taiwan have been successful, and many cram schools 
provide review courses both in law and in other disciplines. It is unlikely that 
courses in other disciplines are managed well but law courses are not in the 
same cram schools.
Studying in cram schools is a typical life experience for many people in 
Taiwan.62 The annual nationwide university entrance examination, for which 
many high school students attend cram schools, is almost the only factor 
determining which university a student will attend and the discipline he 
57. Wilson, supra note 5, at 301–02; see also Steiner, supra note 26, at 391–92.
58. Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, Bar Examinations and Cram Schools in Germany, 24 Wis. Int’l 
L. J. 109, 119 (2006).
59. Steiner, supra note 26, at 380.
60. Although students in Germany might spend as much time in cram school as their Korean 
and Japanese counterparts, they do not have to take the bar exam several times since the 
passing rate in Germany is around 70 percent. See Steiner, supra note 26, at 381–83.
61. Id.
62. Elise Potaka & Benjamin Yeh, Book dragons: Inside Taiwan’s cram schools, China 
Post, June 6, 2011, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-
news/2011/06/06/305070/Book-dragons.htm.
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or she will pursue.63 Because graduates from the best high schools usually 
outperform others on university entrance examinations, junior high school 
graduates also fight to attend prestigious high schools, making the annual high 
school entrance examination nearly as competitive as the university entrance 
examination.64 Cram schools have succeeded in helping many students gain 
access to the universities and departments they want.65 Many Taiwanese also 
attend cram schools to prepare for language proficiency tests for people whose 
native language is not English (such as TOEFL, SAT, or TOEIC), to obtain 
occupational certificates or licenses, or to gain the qualifications required to 
become public servants.66 The cram school industry generally has been able to 
help examinees obtain good scores in all these areas.
Although the bar exam is mostly a test of memory, the same ability tested 
in the university entrance examinations and many other tests in Taiwan, cram 
schools in law appear incapable of helping most exam-takers score highly on 
the national law exam. Before 2003, the Examination Yuan set the bar exam 
pass rate at 16 percent,67 but the actual pass rate has never reached that level.68 
This is because another rule requires that examinees on average score higher 
than 50 points (the full score is 100 points) to pass.69 The pass rate was 5.59 
percent in 1998, 13.88 percent in 1999, 6.01 percent in 2000, 7.06 percent in 
2001, and 7.77 percent in 2002.70 This means that more than 86 percent of law 
school graduates in those years were unable to post an average score of 50 
points on the bar exam. Since 2003, the Examination Yuan lowered the pass 
rate to 8 percent, and eliminated the requirement of a minimum average score.71 
Based on limited data, the lowest scores of those passing the test were 48.3 in 
2007, 48.2 in 2008, and 46.13 in 2010.72 This shows that since 2003, fewer than 8 
percent of those taking the bar exam scored an average higher than 50 points. 
The low scores on the two exams appear to justify the contention (particularly 
63. Pratt, supra note 28, at 151. It might be the same in Korea, see James Card, Life and Death 
Exams in South Korea, Asia Times Online, Nov. 30, 2005, available at http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/Korea/GK30Dg01.html.
64. Id.
65. Potaka & Yeh, supra note 62.
66. The China Post Staff, Taiwan parents want English as official 2nd language, The China 
Post, Jan. 12, 2006, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/2006/01/12/75184/
Taiwan-parents.htm.
67. See Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at art. 19, sec. 1 (2001), available at http://
law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawOldVer.aspx?Pcode=R0040047&LNNDATE=20010403&LS
ER=001.
68. For detailed numbers of bar and judicial exam applicants and passage rates, see Lo, supra note 
24, at 66–68; see also Kuo, supra note 50, at 56–57.
69. Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at art. 19, sec. 2.
70. Lo, supra note 24, at 66.
71. Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at art. 19, sec. 1.
72. Examination Statistics, supra note 51. 
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from the bar) that the pass rate should not be raised. The major function of 
the bar exam is to ensure the competence of new lawyers, and a student with a 
score lower than 50 points can hardly be considered competent.
We could blame law schools for not educating their students well, for not 
adopting interactive teaching methods and for not including on-site practice 
training in the curriculum. But what can be said about cram schools? Low 
scores represent not only the failure of law schools but also of cram schools. 
If most of those who took the bar exam scored well (70 or 80 points, for 
example), it would be easier to justify the appeal of raising the pass rate. 
Because most law school graduates are unable to make satisfactory scores, it 
is difficult to justify raising the pass rate. Apparently, cram schools find it too 
difficult to deal with something in the two exams, and their students believe 
that the inability of cram schools to overcome the difficulty is acceptable and 
are still willing to pay tuition. I believe this difficulty stems from the format of 
the two exams.
2. The Format of the Two Exams
Prior to 2011, the formats of the bar and judicial exams were nearly 
identical.73 Each exam was divided into six or seven sections.74 Each section 
covered one main subject, such as civil law or criminal law, or combined two or 
three subjects, such as conflicts of law or maritime law. Each section contained 
only four essay questions addressing a number of issues.75 For decades, this 
format remained almost unchanged76 but it has three defects. First, because 
each section of the tests includes four questions, the legal issues involved are 
much narrower than the test subject is meant to cover. It seems doubtful, 
therefore, that the exams can differentiate between the competent and the 
incompetent.77 There is a good chance that examinees who obtain high scores 
on the exam know little about untested issues, and those who get low scores 
do so simply because of bad luck.
The second issue associated with the structure of the examinations is that 
every individual examiner possesses tremendous power in deciding the fate 
of test-takers. For instance, there are six sections in the bar exam. Usually, 
73. Lo, supra note 24, at 64.
74. The six sections of the bar exam are Civil Law, Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Criminal 
Procedure, Administrative Law and Compulsory Enforcement Act, Commercial Law, and 
Conflict of Laws. See Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at art. 12 (2009). The 
seven sections of the judicial exam are Civil Law, Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Criminal 
Procedure, Commercial Law, Compulsory Enforcement Act and Conflicts of Laws, and 
Administrative Law. See Regulations of public service special examination of judicial exam 
art. 6 (2009) [hereinafter Regulations—judicial exam].
75. See Chen, supra note 52, at 42.
76. Id. at 40.
77. Id. at 44.
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each of the four questions in each section is written by different examiners.78 
The total score of each section is 100 points, and each essay question has a 
maximum value of 25 points. That is to say, each essay question accounts 
for 4.16 percent (25/(6*100)) of the overall average score. Because there are 
approximately 4,000 to 8,000 applicants every year,79 hundreds are within one 
point difference in the overall average scores. Under a fixed pass rate policy, 
the score for any question can decide the destiny of a given test-taker. If there 
were more exam questions, the importance of each question would be diluted. 
Similarly, if the examinations did not depend entirely on essay questions but 
contained a number of multiple choice questions instead, each question would 
be less important. Nonetheless, the regulations covering the bar and judicial 
exams specifically require that all sections of the exams include only essay 
questions,80 which strengthens the power of individual examiners.
The third defect is the vague standard adopted for grading exam answers. 
Usually answers to one essay question are evaluated by a single grader.81 
Because thousands take the test, it is difficult for a grader to judge all essay 
answers according to the same standards. Furthermore, no sample answer is 
provided after the exams, which makes it even more difficult to set a grading 
standard.82 The accuracy and fairness of the grading results can be challenged 
under such a process.
3. The Examination Yuan: A Gate Keeper Outside the Legal Profession
For decades, the negative effect of the two exams on legal education has been 
widely criticized but the test method of the two exams remains unchanged.83 
At least two features of the examination system can explain the reluctance of 
administrators to reform the tests. One is that the Examination Yuan, a unique 
constitutional branch in Taiwan, is basically immune from accountability for 
inefficiencies in the examinations it oversees. The other is the dominance of 
law scholars in designing and grading the essay questions.
The Examination Yuan, instead of the Judicial Yuan, Ministry of Justice, or 
Taiwan Bar Association, controls the design and administration of the bar and 
judicial exams. The existence of the Examination Yuan in the constitution of 
Taiwan is based on the deeply rooted heritage of civil service examinations in 
78. Pratt, supra note 28, at 156.
79. For detailed numbers of the bar and judicial exams applicants and passage rates, see Lo, supra 
note 24, at 66–68; see also Kuo, supra note 50, at 56–57.
80. See Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at art. 14; see also Regulations—judicial 
exam, supra note 74, at art. 5, sec. 3 (2009).
81. One grader might have to grade over 5,000 examination papers. See Pratt, supra note 28, at 
156.
82. See Chen, supra note 52, at 44.
83. Id. at 42.
45Legal Education Reform in Taiwan
Imperial China.84 Under that system, people from all walks of life, regardless 
of social status, had equal opportunity to take national exams.85 The goal of 
the exams was to find intellectually competent and ethical people through fair 
and objective testing.86 The few selected became elite civil servants enjoying 
privileged status and ample resources for further training.87 The system 
encouraged class mobility and social stabilization until its abolishment in 
the late Qing dynasty.88 When Sun Yet-sen, father of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), developed the constitution of the new China, he believed that the 
spirit of the system should be maintained to ensure fairness and equality when 
recruiting public servants.89 To this end, he separated the power over national 
examinations and recruiting public functionaries from the administrative 
branch and established the Examination Yuan as one of the five branches 
of government.90 According to Article Eighty Six of the Constitution, the 
qualifications of public servants and professional licensure should be decided 
solely by the Examination Yuan.
One resulting problem is that the actions of the Examination Yuan are 
largely immune from outside supervision, particularly from the judicial and 
legislative branches. The traditional checks and balances among the powers 
of the three branches of government in Western constitutions cannot be 
appropriately applied to the interactions between the Examination Yuan 
and other branches of government. Although the power of administering 
examinations is separate from the power of administration, the Legislative 
Yuan (congress) does not have the same power to question members of the 
Examination Yuan about policy issues as it has to question the Executive 
Yuan (the administrative branch of the government),91 nor does it have the 
power to demand that the Examination Yuan alter its policies.92
From the judicial point of view, the Constitutional Court has made it a 
rule to respect the discretion of the Examination Yuan.93 Moreover, Congress 
84. For detailed explanations of civil service examinations in imperial China, see Benjamin A. 
Elman, Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examinations in Late 
Imperial China, 50 J. Asian Stud. 7 (1991), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~elman/
documents/Civil_Service_Examinations.pdf.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Edward A. Kracke, Jr., Family vs. Merit in Chinese Civil Service Examinations Under the 
Empire, 10 Harv. J. Asiatic Stud. 103 (1947).
87. Elman, supra note 84, at 10.
88. Weifang He, China’s Legal Profession: the Nascence and Growing Pains of a Professionalized 
Legal Class, 19 Colum. J. Asian L. 138 (2005).
89. Piero Tozzi, Constitutional Reform on Taiwan: Fulfilling a Chinese Notion of Democratic 
Sovereignty?, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1193, 1208 n.69 (1995).
90. Id.
91. Zhonghua Minquo Xianfa (Constitution of the Republic of China), art. 57 sec. 1 (1947).
92. Id. at art. 57 sec. 2 (1947) .
93. Dafaguan Huiyi Jieshi (Grand Justices Council Interpretations), no. 682 (2010).
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has legislatively shielded the Examination Yuan’s grading practices from 
administrative review94 and barred examinees from requesting sample answers 
for essay questions.95 Although citizens may theoretically influence the policies 
of the Examination Yuan through congressional legislation, the number of 
examinees for any exam is too small to become an influential lobbying group. 
In short, the Examination Yuan rarely faces pressure from other branches of 
government. The independence of the Examination Yuan is meant to prevent 
class politics and prerogatives from interfering in the examination process.96 
But, because of its independent nature, the Examination Yuan is under no 
pressure to correct inefficiencies, justify the absence of empirical evidence 
to support testing methods or its tardiness in reforming the bar and judicial 
exams.
4. The Interaction between Academic Prestige and the Power of Examiners
In the United States, no law scholar would regard a position as a bar 
examiner as important to his or her academic career. However in Taiwan, and 
probably also in Japan and Korea, being a bar examiner might expand a law 
scholar’s academic influence, indirectly bringing nationwide recognition. The 
interaction between academic prestige and the power of examiners comes 
from the dominance of law scholars in the two examinations.
Although the Examination Yuan enjoys great independence, it is unable 
to provide full-time jobs for the large number of experts responsible for 
the design or grading of national examinations. The work of designing and 
grading questions in the bar and judicial exams is performed by outside 
experts. In the selection of examiners for the two exams, being a law school 
academic or publishing textbooks on subjects included in the exams is not 
considered a conflict of interest. This differs considerably from the policies 
associated with most bar exams in the United States. For example, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions prohibits any full-
time or adjunct member of any law school faculty from acting as a member of 
the committee or as an examiner.97 In Taiwan, senior full-time law professors 
are generally selected as chairs of examination committees and as examiners.98 
This reflects the traditional system of Chinese civil service examinations, in 
which examiners must be authoritative experts in the tested fields because 
94. Administrative Procedure Act, art. 3.
95. Dianshi fa (The Examination Affairs Act), art. 23 (2002), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/
LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=R0020001.
96. Yeh Jiunn-Rong, Changing Forces of Constitutional and Regulatory Reform in Taiwan, 4 J. 
Chinese L. 83, 85 n.7 (1990).
97. Louisiana Supreme Court Comm. On Bar Admissions, Admission Rules, Rule XVII § 1(E) 
(2008), available at http://www.lascba.org/admission_rules.asp. Several states adopt similar 
rules. See Lawrence M. Grosberg, Standardized Clients: A Possible Improvement for the Bar 
Exam, 20 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 841, 869 n. 104 (2004).
98. See Examination Affairs Act, art. 5–8, 10. In Japan, leading law professors make and grade 
the bar exam. See Miyazawa et al., supra note 27, at 349.
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they represent the state. Serving as an examiner in the bar or judicial exams 
means gaining official recognition, despite the fact that the names of those 
who framed questions for the exams are never revealed.
Although most examiners have attempted to design impartial and practical 
questions for the two exams, the fairness of the exams can be tainted by a 
few individuals who manipulate loopholes in pursuit of their own interests. 
In 2002, a task force led by Professor Chen Hwei-Syin from the National 
Chengchi University College of Law completed a thorough empirical study 
of the original test papers, particularly those from the 2001 bar and judicial 
exams.99 Their report confirmed several long held suspicions related to the 
exams.100 It found that—despite the thousands of law scholars and professionals 
qualified to be examiners—many examiners for the 2001 bar exam were from 
the faculty of three national universities and 70.85 percent of those who 
passed the 2001 bar exam were from the same three universities.101 The study 
found that the Examination Yuan did not have a mechanism for reviewing 
the background of scholars and selecting examiners.102 At least 25 scholars 
had been examiners on the same exam for more than three years.103 In panel 
discussions with prestigious law scholars and professionals specializing in the 
subjects tested by the exams, many experts agreed that some essay questions 
did not address fundamental legal issues, rather advancing issues not usually 
taught in the curriculum of most law schools.104 Some test questions included 
unusual or unique jargon based on the distinct opinions of one scholar or a 
small group of scholars.105
The effects of these problems are obvious. Because the two exams are 
so competitive, no one taking the test can risk losing a single point on any 
question. However, the scope of tested content remains highly uncertain and 
the standards of grading are so vague that a rational examinee will only choose 
to study the opinions of law professors who are likely to serve as examiners. 
Memorizing the opinions of every law scholar is far beyond the capacity of 
any individual test-taker. Therefore, cram schools take over and become an 
indispensable part of preparation for the two exams. Cram schools cannot 
guarantee high scores but they represent the students’ best shot.
The dominance of law scholars in the two examinations has had a profound 
effect on academic politics. Professional exams are expected to test general, if 
99. See Hwei-Syin Chen et al., Sifaguan, lushi kaoshi shiti xiangguan wenti fenxi zhuanan yanjiu 
baogao (Report on Issues Relating to the Questions of the Judicial Officers Exam and the 
Bar Exam) 4–5 (Ministry of Examination, 2002). 
100. Id. at 42–45, 48–49.
101. Id.
102. Chen et al., supra note 99, at 160–62.
103. Id. at n.30.
104. Chen, supra note 52, at 50–51. 
105. Chen et al., supra note 99, at 1179.
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not unanimous, opinions on issues shared by experts in the field being tested. 
By contrast, the success of a scholar is largely decided by whether he or she can 
create a distinctive theory that eventually becomes a mainstream view of the 
professional community. Under the current examination system, an examiner 
could use the power to design questions to promote personal opinions. Law 
students would have no choice but to purchase the textbooks and study the 
theories, published papers and class notes of a scholar repeatedly named an 
examiner. Students would do this out of fear that the examiner might grade 
favorably answers that apply his theories and give a reduced grade to answers 
that do not—even if this does not happen in practice. In this way, the two 
exams become important mechanisms by which law scholars promulgate their 
theories and expand their academic influence beyond the boundaries of their 
home campuses.
The mission of the law profession is to promote justice. Yet, widely held 
suspicions about the fairness of examinations have no doubt had a negative 
impact on the ethical development of law professionals. If law students are 
unable to trust their instructors to design examination questions in an impartial 
manner, how can professors expect their students to devote themselves to the 
public interest? If the administration of examinations is unfair, any attempt to 
enhance the ethical development of new lawyers by including the subject of 
legal ethics in the bar and judicial exams would be nothing more than empty 
talk. In my opinion, because the fairness of the two exams always has been a 
concern, they represent an annual nationwide course on “legal unethics” for 
all law students in Taiwan.
IV. The Failed Reform Effort, 2005 to 2007
1. Two Reform Proposals Initiated by the Government
 After Japan and Korea adopted U.S.-style legal education, a series of formal 
discussions and government actions occurred in Taiwan in 2005, 2006 and 
2007 on the need to pursue similar changes.106 These actions ended in failure 
because of resistance from legal academia, but the lack of success should not 
be considered the result of self-centeredness. Academics hesitated to support 
radical changes because of the negative consequences from reforms in Korea 
and Japan. From my perspective, the potential for conflict among reform 
goals—such as increasing the number of practicing lawyers and enhancing 
the quality of legal service—is the fundamental reason Taiwan decided not to 
follow in the footsteps of Japan and Korea.
106. Hwei-Syin Chen, Hua weiji wei zhuanji: tan faxue jie ruche yinying faxue jiaoyu gaige de 
hushing (Turning crisis into opportunity: how should legal academia respond to the calls for 
reform of legal education), 112 Taiwan L. J. 90 (2002) [hereinafter Chen, Journal].
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In 2005, the Human Rights Advisory Commission, convened by then Vice-
President Annette Lu,107 established the Committee to Promote the Reform of 
Taiwan’s Legal System.108 In May, 2005, the government appointed Chang-fa 
Lo, then dean of National Taiwan University College of Law, to organize a 
task force for the reform of legal education.109 In the wake of several meetings 
by the task force, large-scale forums and an international conference on the 
experience of the United States, Japan, South Korea and Germany, the task 
force wrote a white paper on reform of Taiwan’s legal education system at the 
end of 2005.110 The report proposed that Taiwan should establish professional 
law schools at the graduate level on the Japan/Korea model.111 Later, at a forum 
in April, 2006, the Examination Yuan and Ministry of Education announced 
proposals to be put into effect starting in the fall of 2008.112 This was the first 
time that a concrete timetable had been announced.
The core concept of the proposals was creation of a legal professional 
institute, similar to those in Japan and South Korea.113 Under the proposals, 
all graduate institutes were to be transformed into legal professional institutes 
after 2008.114 The Ministry of Education was to close institutes unable to meet 
accreditation standards and students who enrolled in undergraduate LL.B. 
programs on or before 2008 still would be permitted to attend the exams until 
2022.115 After 2022, only graduates from legal professional institutes would be 
qualified to participate in the two professional admission exams.116
In 2006, the Ministry of Education asked Professor Lo to draft the 
accreditation standards for the legal professional institute. Lo’s task force 
presented its final draft of the standards in October, 2006, which were modeled 
after the American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure for 
Approval of Law Schools 2005–2006 and the standards adopted by the 
Japanese Ministry of Education for the accreditation of professional law 
107. Annette Lu earned a master’s degree from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
College of Law in 1971 and an LL.M. degree from Harvard Law School in 1978. See Tenth-
term Vice President, Republic of China, the Republic of China Yearbook—Taiwan 2002, 
available at http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/2002/bio_lu.htm.
108. Wang, supra note 13, at 146.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 147.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 148.
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Military of Education, Falüren yangcheng zhidu xingge fangan zuotanhui (The symposium 
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schools.117 In June, 2007, the Ministry of Education drafted rules for subsidies 
to help graduate institutes transform themselves into legal professional 
institutes.118 Eligibility for a governmental subsidy requires that an institute 
maintain a student-teacher ratio no higher than 15 to 1. The rules also specify 
that a subsidy is to be provided for courses or activities dealing with legal 
ethics, clinical education and topics related to globalization.119 Importantly, 
appended to the rules is a draft of the accreditation standards for professional 
law schools promoted by the Ministry of Education, based on findings of the 
task force.120
Although many law scholars agreed at the time that something had to be 
done to improve the system while expressing willingness to discuss prospective 
reform proposals, they resisted making radical changes in such a short time 
without first achieving a consensus among legal academics. This opposition 
was particularly acute among those unfamiliar with the notion of a legal 
professional institute, including the large number of law scholars who never 
studied in the United States. Many law scholars criticized the proposals. In 
2007, a bill proposed by Ming-chen Chen,121 a legislator who strongly favored 
American-style legal education, was the last straw for many of these legal 
scholars. Chen’s bill provided very little description of the new professional law 
institute but would have moved up the deadline for graduates of professional 
law institutes to take exams from 2022 to 2015.122 This meant that the entire 
system of legal education would have to be transformed by 2013, (just six years 
after the proposal), to enable the first group of students under the new system 
to graduate in 2015. The imprecision of the proposal and the strict timetable 
led to confusion and anxiety among scholars.
After countless meetings, forums, symposiums and conferences between 
2005 and 2007, a number of leading scholars decided to oppose the proposals. 
In April, 2007, about 40 scholars, including the successor to the dean of 
National Taiwan University College of Law, signed a press release listing the 
reasons why the proposals should not be adopted.123 Because the Ministry of 
Education refused to postpone its proposals, in June, 2007, ten senior law 
school administrators met with then-President Chen Shui-bian to explain 
117. Chang-fa Lo et al., Falu zhuanye yanjiu suo shezhi biaozhun zhi yanjiu qimo baogao shu 
(Final report of the standards of accreditation for the Professional Legal Institute) 7 (2006) 
(project commissioned by the Executive Yuan, Ministry of Education).
118. Yin-Lung Chen, Taiwan faxue jiaoyu gaige zhi fangshi (The methods of legal education 
reform in Taiwan), in Paper Collection for Taiwan Law Society 2007 Annual Meeting of 
Law, at 2, 2–3 (2007), available at http://fju.lawbank.com.tw/file/lawreform.pdf.
119. Id. at 5–6.
120. Id. at 6–8.
121. Wang, supra note 13, at 148.
122. Chen, Journal, supra note 106, at 92.
123. Id. at 92–93.
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their doubts.124 Under strong opposition from law scholars, President Chen 
directed the Ministry of Education to terminate the plan instituted by the 
Legal Professional Institute.125 The Examination Yuan later suspended plans to 
amend the rules related to the two exams.126 Members of the Legislative Yuan 
who belonged to the same political party as President Chen also withdrew 
their support from Ming-chen Chen’s bill.127 Debate among legal academics 
on alternative measures to reform legal education gradually ended.
2. Graduate Law Institutes: Alternative or Complementary to the Current System?
As one commentator correctly pointed out, legal education reform in 
democratic Taiwan no longer can be implemented according to the will of a 
few political powerbrokers.128 However, two issues related to the 2005–2007 
proposals merit further analysis. First, most of those who opposed the plans 
advocated a “two-track” model of legal education, in which the graduates of 
existing undergraduate law departments would remain eligible to take the 
bar and judicial exams.129 Second, the proposals failed to mention several 
key changes from the reforms in Japan and Korea that were meant to assist 
law schools in obtaining the necessary resources to meet the accreditation 
standards.130 A failure to provide these mechanisms is the major reason that 
law scholars had no incentive to comply with the reform proposals.
In the 2007 draft of subsidiary rules to assist in the establishment of legal 
professional institutes, the Ministry of Education listed the goals of these 
reforms, such as including law students from more diverse backgrounds, 
enhancing the competence of law school graduates to deal with international 
and transnational matters and narrowing the gap between theory and practice 
through clinical legal education.131 Opponents argued that the models provided 
by Japan and Korea were not the only means to achieve these goals.132 The 
press release signed by 40 scholars in 2007 pointed out that no empirical study 
had proven that graduates of undergraduate law programs are less competent 
than students who spend three years in graduate programs. Limiting the two 
exams to graduates of professional legal institutes likely would provide no 
benefit and raise the cost of legal education (because of higher tuition and 
longer time at law schools) and increase the tendency of students to focus only 
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on subjects relating to the exams.133 In addition, Taiwan needs to develop a 
more diversified legal profession.134 The governmental proposals favoring only 
legal professional institutes conflict with the multiple demands of Taiwanese 
society.135 In short, opponents admit that something must be done to improve 
legal education in Taiwan, but they still believe that the current multiple tracks 
are better than the unified system in Japan, which relies on graduate-level 
professional law schools. Thus, the major issue is whether the current multiple 
tracks are capable of satisfying social demands for legal service in Taiwan.
In the new Japanese system, the time that bar passers must spend in 
central institutes in practice training has been cut from two years to one.136 For 
students with a law background, the reduction in training could be considered 
part of the education provided by the new graduate-level law schools. Thus, 
the new system would extend the total length of study by one or two years. 
However, practice training in Taiwan lasts only one month. The practical 
skills of entry-level lawyers, therefore, are lower than those found in Japan 
and Korea. Requiring a graduate degree to take the bar exam would greatly 
extend the total time required to train a new lawyer. Opponents of the reforms 
remain unconvinced that current undergraduate programs produce lawyers 
incompetent to handle the general run of domestic cases, which require only 
basic legal knowledge.
On the other hand, the demands for two other types of legal service have 
grown dramatically in the last two decades. The growth of Taiwan’s high-
technology industry has increased demand for law practitioners familiar with 
other disciplines, such as patents, biotechnology, cyber law, taxation and 
health care. In addition, economic globalization, particularly since Taiwan 
joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, has increased the demand for 
legal services related to international or transnational law and regulations.137 
Opponents have acknowledged the existence of these demands, but believe 
that existing J.D.-like graduate programs in Taiwan are sufficient to meet 
them.138
During the last two decades, several universities with longstanding 
undergraduate law programs, including Soochow University, National 
Chengchi University, National Taiwan University and National Taipei 
University, established graduate institutes that admit non-law graduates.139 
These universities have maintained their undergraduate programs. Their 




136. Wilson, supra note 5, at 320.
137. Lo, supra note 24, at 70–75.
138. Yin-Lung Chen, supra note 118, at 13–14.
139. Wang, supra note 13, at 142.
53Legal Education Reform in Taiwan
graduate programs, however, closely resemble the new law schools in Japan. 
Although these programs are similar to American J.D. programs, they differ 
from the American model in two important respects.
First, most American law schools offer similar basic law courses in the first-
year J.D. programs, with more diversified and advanced courses in the second 
and third years. At the four universities mentioned above, law subjects tested 
in the two national exams still are a significant part of curriculum throughout 
the entire three years, just as in undergraduate programs.140 Some courses even 
teach graduate and undergraduate students in the same classrooms. This is 
probably because most law faculties must devote the majority of their time 
to traditional law subjects, making fewer resources available for J.D-like 
programs.
The second difference is the low pass rate for the two exams. Students of 
these programs either devote most of their time to preparing for the bar or 
select careers other than as legal practitioners. 141 It is no wonder that scholars 
in these universities object to the view that legal professional institutes will 
attract smarter students than those in existing undergraduate programs.
In this respect, the Korean reforms, in which universities can offer either 
undergraduate or graduate law programs, but not both, are worth further 
analysis.142 The advantage of this policy is that it forces universities to devote 
all their resources to only one type of program, ensuring that they have more 
concentrated developmental strategies. During the last two decades, Taiwan 
has seen several universities with no undergraduate law programs establish 
graduate institutes, a trend that is similar to the Korean model.143 Because 
these institutes are not large enough to offer a comprehensive legal education, 
they only focus on special areas of law, such as maritime law, technology law, 
finance law, government law and intellectual property law.144 The reason for 
this policy is that these areas of law require knowledge of other disciplines, 
giving students in areas other than law a number of advantages. Though there 
is concern that these institutes must compromise by allocating resources and 
staff between the two groups of students,145 they closely resemble the legal 
professional institute model promoted by reformers.
Because these institutes are new, their innovative approach to the curriculum 
does not face strong objection from faculty, as is common in traditional law 
schools. The mission of these institutes is to satisfy the demands of industry 
and businesses dealing with transnational regulations and they provide more 
courses related to foreign law or even the development of practical skills. 
140. Lo, supra note 24, at 55–56.
141. Wang, supra note 13, at 142.
142. Wilson, supra note 5, at 338–39.
143. Wang, supra note 13, at 142–43.
144. Wang, supra note 13, at 143.
145. Id.
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These courses help students—even without lawyers’ licenses—find jobs such 
as in-house counsels for high-technology companies engaged in international 
trade. The institutes also can help students lacking background knowledge in 
disciplines other than law to get job offers in areas in which there is a shortage 
of legal experts.146
From a policy perspective, the success of these two types of graduate 
institutes reduces the pressure to reform legal education, since these established 
programs train professionals who can satisfy demands for interdisciplinary 
skills. In general, opponents to the reforms view these new graduate institutes 
not as an alternative but as complementary, to the current system based on 
undergraduate programs.147 In my opinion, this view stems from several issues 
neglected in the reform proposals, including the number of full-time faculty, 
flexible tuition rates and whether to permit full-time law professors to practice 
law.
3. Issues Ignored in the Proposals
During the last two decades, the number of universities or colleges 
providing legal education has increased from 8 to 37, representing a fourfold 
increase since 1990.148 Because the Ministry of Education stringently limits the 
number of teachers a university may recruit, the size of the full-time faculty 
in most new legal education institutions is small, with usually fewer than 
ten professors.149 The number of lectures that the full-time teaching staff can 
give is insufficient to provide as comprehensive an education as that offered 
by the new professional law schools in Japan and Korea.150 As a result, these 
institutes produce only a small portion of the law students in the country as a 
whole.151 Under the reform proposal, graduate law institutes that fail to meet 
146. For example, the Institute of Technology Law at National Chiao Tung University, though 
quite young compared to the foregoing universities that provide undergraduate law 
programs, offered courses to most IP in-house counsels at Science Park in Hsinchu, the 
Taiwanese counterpart of Silicon Valley.
147. Yin-Lung Chen, supra note 118, at 13–14.
148. Wang, supra note 13, at 141.
149. For example, in 2012, the Institute of Technology Law at National Chiao Tung University 
has 9 full-time faculty members, which is one of the largest faculties among all graduate 
law institutes. See NCTU Law, Faculty Member, available at http://www.itl.nctu.edu.
tw/community_en.htm. For information regarding the faculty sizes of individual law 
departments or institutes, see Ministry of Education Website, available at http://ulist.moe.
gov.tw/. 
150. The new law schools in Japan are required to have at least 12 full-time faculty members, and 
the student-teacher ratio must be no less than one full-time faculty member per 15 students. 
See Japan University Accreditation Association, Law School Standards 13, available at http://
www.juaa.or.jp/en/images/accreditation/standards_law.pdf. 
151. For example, the graduate institute for non-law background students at National Taiwan 
University admits 32 students annually; see Graduate Institute of Interdisciplinary Legal 
Studies, Admissions Information, available at http://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/giilslaw/chinese/
versec/versec_enter.htm. The institute has the largest student body among all graduate 
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accreditation standards would have to cease operations. But the proposals 
did not suggest any approach, such as merging with other law programs, for 
the institutes to increase the sizes of their faculties. Thus, it appears that the 
reforms would significantly reduce the number of students, law scholars and 
law schools countrywide without any promise of improving the quality of legal 
education.
Another neglected issue is tuition. The professional graduate law schools in 
Japan and Korea have greater leeway to adjust their rates.152 Failure to provide 
this flexibility in Taiwan might be the key reason for the failure of the reforms. 
High tuition rates would enable law schools to provide higher salaries as an 
incentive to convince law practitioners to shift their careers from practice 
to academia, enabling them to create clinical programs. A more flexible 
tuition policy also might encourage schools to improve their curriculum 
and pedagogy. When costs increase, students likely would study harder and 
demand better teaching performance. Improved teaching performance would 
lead to better lawyers and law firms then might offer more associate positions 
to beginning lawyers. All of this would create a virtuous cycle—one not seen 
before in Taiwan.
The Ministry of Education historically has established caps on tuition for 
both public and private universities.153 Because of the uncertain economic 
outlook since the 2008 global recession, it is unlikely that the government 
will change the long-established policy of low tuition any time soon. Because 
of similarities in the tuition rates of all universities, improving the quality of 
teaching would not increase the funding of schools. As a result, a law professor 
would not obtain more resources from his or her school by educating better 
lawyers. On the other hand, research projects commissioned by government 
agencies represent the major source of research funding and additional income 
for scholars and law schools. It follows that law schools are likely to pay more 
attention to research than the education of competent professionals.
institutes that admit non-law students. For information regarding the student body sizes of 
individual law departments or institutes, see Ministry of Education Website, supra note 149.
152. Kamiya, supra note 19, at 167–68; Jasper Kim, Socrates v. Confucius: An Analysis of South 
Korea’s Implementation of the American Law School Model, 10 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y 322, 
332 n. 58 (2009); It appears that the new Korean law schools are still underfunded. See 
Kyong-Whan Ahn, International Conference on Legal Education Reform: Law Reform in 
Korea and the Agenda of “Graduate Law Schools,” 24 Wis. Int’l L.J. 223, 233–34 (2006).
153. See Daxue fa (University Act), art. 35 (2011), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/
LawAll.aspx?PCode=H0030001; see also Sili xuexuao fa (Private School Law), art. 47 sec. 1 
(2011), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=H0020001; 
Zhuanke xuexiao fa (Junior College Law), art. 35 sec.1 (2010), available at http://law.moj.gov.
tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=H0040001.
56	 Journal of Legal Education
Another issue is whether law professors should be allowed to practice law 
and join the bar while engaged as full-time teachers.154 Under the current legal 
framework, law professors in public universities are viewed as public servants 
and are not permitted to practice law in their off-hours.155 The reform proposals 
would require legal professional institutes to offer clinical training and draw 
at least one-fifth of their faculty from professional lawyers and judges.156 The 
proposals failed to recognize, however, that a law practitioner who no longer 
could practice law after joining a law school likely would be unable to lead 
students in dealing with cases in law clinics. Because the proposals failed to 
deal with issues such as this, their blueprint appeared unrealistic.
However, there is a rationale behind the structure of these graduate 
institutes. The new professional law schools in Japan and Korea admit both law 
and non-law graduates.157 Some scholars are skeptical about putting students 
with different backgrounds in the same classroom,158 which is uncommon in 
American law schools and appears inconsistent with the American model of 
legal education. Yet the experience of National Chiao Tung University Institute 
of Technology Law, where I teach, proves that this kind of arrangement can 
be effective and productive, at least for areas of law related to interdisciplinary 
issues. Our institute occasionally combines four types of students in courses 
related to technology law including law and non-law students, and full-time 
and part-time students.159 In discussing legal cases involving high technology, 
some non-law students are able to explain relevant technical knowledge more 
effectively even than law teachers, because the laboratories or companies in 
which the students work deal with technology similar to that mentioned in the 
cases. Students with a background in law often are better at analyzing legal 
154. This issue was raised in the research project on the accreditation standards of the Professional 
Legal Institute, but was not included in the government’s proposals. See Lo et al., supra note 
117, at 73–79.
155. Id. at 76–77.
156. With respect to clinical legal education in Taiwan, there are few clinical training programs 
or courses available at most universities. See Lo, supra note 24, at 61. Currently the most 
advanced form is the judicial externship. In 2005, National Chiao Tung University launched 
the first judicial court externship course collaborating with Taipei District Court. Advice 
from John Marshall Law School and assistance from Ching-fang Lin, then president of the 
court and an alumnus of Duke Law School, shaped the content of the course. The institute 
selects graduate students to clerk in district courts with one-to-one instruction from senior 
judges. Students spend at least 160 hours in court to obtain three credits. The externship 
includes reading documents in cases, observing trial process, discussing issues in cases with 
supervising judges, researching precedents and laws, writing memoranda, etc. In 2008, In-
Jaw Lai, then president of Judicial Yuan and an alumnus of Harvard Law School, decided 
to promote this model nationwide. Judicial Yuan promulgated regulations encouraging all 
courts in Taiwan to conduct externship projects with law schools. Some law schools later 
developed similar externship courses, but primarily at the undergraduate level.
157. Wilson, supra note 5, at 339.
158. Id. at 331.
159. It is now a common structure among law schools in Taiwan.
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issues because they have studied law much longer. They often provide inspiring 
insights for non-law students. Classes like this provide a win-win situation that 
a group with only one type of student would be unable to achieve. The diverse 
background of the pool of students at Chiao Tung has proven to be a great 
resource for the development of interdisciplinary areas of law.160
Another issue associated with the reforms in Japan and Korea is whether 
to maintain the undergraduate programs.161 If the new graduate-level law 
schools could transform non-law graduates into good lawyers, why keep the 
undergraduate programs? Although literature on this issue is scarce,162 as far 
as I am concerned, an obvious answer to this question involves language 
competency. For students in American law schools, English is the only 
language required. However, for an East Asian country in which English is 
not the official language, three years of training may be insufficient for non-
law students to develop into excellent transnational lawyers because courses in 
domestic law have already taken up most of their time.163 Some transnational 
lawyers might obtain an LL.M. degree before dealing with practical issues 
related to foreign matters but requiring that they obtain a master’s degree 
before taking the bar exam might make the process of becoming a lawyer 
prohibitively long.
 According to this analysis, the two-track model of legal education 
advocated by opponents of the reforms should not be viewed simply as a way 
for orthodox law scholars to protect their own interests or as a halfway step 
toward a more uniform system. Instead, it could be viewed as a means to satisfy 
social demands for a variety of legal services which might optimize social utility 
better than a unified system. The mission of undergraduate law programs is 
to train competent general legal practitioners capable of representing clients 
with simple legal problems. The mission of graduate law programs, on the 
other hand, is to train legal specialists capable of handling complex issues, 
160. When Taiwan established its Intellectual Property Court in 2008, half of the judges, who 
had no scientific background, were graduates from this institute. Although still relatively 
young, it is partly because of this model that graduates of this institute have become sought-
after in Taiwan by high-tech companies needing legal counsel. 
161. Wilson, supra note 5, at 331.
162. Kashiwagi, supra note 8, at 188.
163. The experience of National Chiao Tung University can confirm this assertion. The institute 
offers a full spectrum of the first-year courses at American law schools and some upper-
level courses on American law, taught in Chinese or English. The institutes also actively 
collaborate with foreign law schools, on joint degrees or distance learning courses. When 
competing for an offer at big law firms, sometimes graduates of the institute, though never 
having studied abroad, beat competitors graduating from the LL.M. programs of top 
American law schools. But law-background students are more likely than non-law students 
to succeed in such competition. My interpretation is that the training at undergraduate law 
programs gave the law-graduates advantages in understanding advanced American law. For 
some non-law graduates who do not need a Taiwanese bar license because they prefer to be 
international lawyers, the institute allows non-law students to replace some required courses 
of domestic law with Anglo-American law credits, but this would reduce the students’ 
understanding of Taiwanese law. 
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particularly those facing the challenges of globalization. Of course, there 
might be no harm in asking graduates of undergraduate law programs to 
spend two or three more years in professional law programs before allowing 
them to take the bar exam, as is done in the new systems in Japan and Korea. 
However, if the content of the bar exam favors generalists, the pressure to 
pass might distract students in graduate institutes from studying areas of law 
that are not tested. Bar exam reform is indispensable for any workable reform 
proposal.
V. Reformative Events after 2007
1. The Casebook Writing Movement
After government action on legal education reform ended in 2007, debate 
diminished dramatically. There remain a number of changes worth noting, 
however. For example, in the Innovative Teaching Program of Legal Science 
in Taiwan, sponsored by the Ministry of Education and hosted by Professor 
Hwei-Syin Chen of National Chengchi University, more than 100 law scholars 
participated in drafting innovative teaching materials between 2007 and 
2011.164 The mission was to inspire the development of innovative teaching 
in law-related courses.165 Those materials related to local cases, dialogical 
pedagogy, and professional ethics were the major topics of this plan.166 More 
than 50 casebooks on the market today were produced during those four years 
and many law scholars had their first experience using the Socratic Method.167 
The program, which can be called the “casebook writing movement,” was 
unique in Taiwanese legal history. Although funding for the initiative ended 
in 2011, its impact on instruction in law schools in Taiwan has been profound. 
Changes in legal education may take time but they will come.
2. Old Wine in Old Bottles? The New Examination Rules of 2011
Another change is the promulgation of new rules for the judicial and 
bar exams by the Examination Yuan, which went into effect in 2011.168 The 
requirements for taking the two exams—no limit on time for the test-takers 
164. For a more detailed introduction on this project, see The Office of Innovative Teaching and 
Research in Education of Legal Science, Introduction, available at http://140.119.178.246/
modules/tinyd0/index.php?id=8; see also Hwei-Syin Chen, Chuangxin yu shijian-Taiwan 
faxue jiaoyu de gaibian changshi: 2007 nian-2010 nian (Innovation and Practice, the attempt 
to reform legal education in Taiwan, 2007–2011), in Chuangxin yu shijian: Taiwan faxue 
jiaoyu (Innovation and Practice: legal Education in Taiwan), 3, 3–26 (Hwei-Syin Chen ed., 
2011) [hereinafter Chen, Innovation].
165. Id.
166. The Office of Innovative Teaching and Research in Education of Legal Science, supra note 
164.
167. Chen, Innovation, supra note 164, at 7.
168. Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at arts. 3, 6, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20 (2009); 
Regulations—judicial exam, supra note 74, at art. 16 (2009).
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and the format of one section composed of essay questions—are unchanged.169 
However, examinees now must pass an additional screening test of multiple 
choice questions before taking a second essay examination.170 The major 
function of this first stage—the multiple-choice test—is to weed out a significant 
number of exam-takers from the essay test, thus reducing the number of 
essay questions that examiners must grade.171 In addition, new topics have 
been added to the first test, including international public law, international 
commercial law, securities law, legal English and legal ethics.172 The pass rate 
of the first stage is 33 percent for both bar and judicial exams.173 For the bar 
exam, the pass quota of the second stage is 33 percent. For the judicial exam, 
these figures are determined by the manpower quota set by the Judicial Yuan 
and the Ministry of Justice multiplied by 1.1.174 The ultimate pass rate of the 
bar exam will be increased from the previous 8 percent to 10.89 percent.175
Under this new rule, 926 examinees successfully passed the 2011 bar exam,176 
the largest number in history. Considering that the population of Korea is 
double that of Taiwan,177 the 926 is roughly equivalent to the 1,500 to 2,000 
students of new Korean law schools who are expected to pass their nation’s 
revised bar exam in 2012.178 Since the population of Japan is 5.5 times larger 
than that of Taiwan, the 926 is equivalent to 5093 in Japan.179 But the number 
169. Id. See also Lishian Huang, Xinzhi sifaguan ji lüshi guojia kaoshi yushi shiti pinzhi yu 
yingkaoren yijian fenxi zhi yanjiu (Research on the new judges and lawyers national 
examination pretest with regards to item quality and feedback from the testees), National 
Elite, Vol. 6, Issue 3, at 134–35 (2010), available at http://wwwc.moex.gov.tw/main/Quarterly/
wHandQuarterly_File.ashx?quarterly_id=197.
170. Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at arts. 3, 12 (2009); see also Regulations—
judicial exam, supra note 74, at arts. 4–6 (2009) [hereinafter Regulations – judicial exam].
171. Lin, supra note 46, at 7.
172. Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at art. 12 (2009); see also Regulations—judicial 
exam, supra note 74, at art. 5.
173. Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at art. 19, sec. 4 (2009); see also Regulations—
judicial exam, supra note 74, at art. 11.
174. Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at art. 19, sec. 5 (2009); see also Regulations—
judicial exam, supra note 74, at art. 11, sec. 2.
175. Lin, supra note 46, at 1.
176. See Ministry of Examination, Yibainian zhuanmen zhiye ji jishu renyuan gaodeng kaoshi 
lüshi kaoshi diershi baokao renshu ji luqu huo jige lü an leike fen (The statistics of the 
number of applicants and the passing rate for the 2011 bar exam), available at http://wwwc.
moex.gov.tw/main/ExamReport/wHandStatisticsFile.ashx?StaticticsID=1193&blnMulFile
s=True.
177. At the end of 2011, the population in Taiwan was about 23 million; Korea had some 48 
million. See CIA’s World Facebook: Korea, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
178. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 340.
179. The population in Japan is around 127 million. See CIA’s World Facebook: Japan, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html.
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of successful examinees in the Japanese 2009 bar exam was only 2043,180 which 
means Taiwan is still producing more lawyers than Japan annually under the 
new rules.
The new rules in Taiwan have been acclaimed as a sign of progress. In reality, 
however, they have only reinforced the essay-question format and teaching 
methods based on rote memorization. During the last decade, the number 
of law graduates has increased four-fold,181 as has the number of applicants 
for the two exams. As one member of the examination committee pointed 
out,182 grading more than 10,000 test-takers each year makes it impossible to 
maintain the traditional grading process, in which one grader evaluates all 
of the answers to one essay question.183 The screening mechanism of the first 
stage excludes two-thirds of the test-takers from the essay-based exam, thereby 
considerably easing the burden on examiners. It has been claimed that this 
change will improve the quality of grading by enabling examiners to focus on 
fewer answers and maintain more consistent standards.184 In addition, the pass 
rate of the second stage of the bar exam will be increased to 33 percent from 
the old pass rate of only 8 percent.
While these claims are true, the burden on those preparing to take the 
exams has increased considerably under the new rules. They must now take 
four instead of two tests each year if they wish to follow both tracks. In 
addition, the justification for excluding two-thirds of test-takers from the essay 
test is unpersuasive. If an examinee passes the first stage but fails in the second 
stage, the qualification gained by passing the first stage cannot be retained 
for the following year.185 If the first-stage test is truly intended to differentiate 
more intelligent students from their less gifted counterparts, why not retain 
this qualification? If the first test is unable to make such distinctions, how can 
failed examinees be justifiably excluded from the second-stage test?
Despite these shortcomings, the new rules have had a positive impact. The 
answers to each essay question will no longer be graded by one, but by two 
graders.186 If the gap between the two scores is significant, a third grader will be 
brought in to reach a consensus.187 Graders will be provided sample answers,188 
theoretically to ensure that grading is more objective. The Examination Yuan 
180. Wilson, supra note 5, at 327.
181. Wang, supra note 13, at 141.
182. Lin, supra note 46, at 2.
183. Pratt, supra note 28, at 156.
184. Lin, supra note 46, at 2.
185. Taiwan’s Bar Exam Regulations, supra note 21, at art. 3 (2009); see also Regulations—judicial 
exam, supra note 74, at art. 4.
186. Lin, supra note 46, at 7.
187. Id.
188. Huang, supra note 169, at 145.
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will provide guidelines for each subject before the exam to ensure that all 
prospective test-takers are aware of the scope of tested subjects.189 
However, the pre-reform experience of Japan and Korea tells us that these 
changes are bound to fail: the new first stage of multiple choice questions is an 
obvious duplication of their pre-reform systems.190 If this modification could 
have saved law students time in preparing for examinations and, therefore, 
have raised the overall performance of legal education, the two countries would 
not have had to establish graduate professional law schools. Because no limits 
have been imposed on the number of times an examinee may take the exams, 
test-takers who fail inevitably will participate in the exam the following year, 
thereby enlarging the pool of applicants and the number of answer papers an 
examiner has to grade.191 In addition, because the dominance of scholars in 
the exams remains, law schools have no incentive to change their pedagogy 
or curriculum. The new rules will simply delay, rather than prevent, radical 
reform in the future.
3. Changes in Judicial Recruitment
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the separation of national 
admission exams and training paths between lawyers and judicial officers has 
made it easier for Taiwan to increase the number of individuals passing the 
bar exam. That separation has generated continuous debate throughout each 
stage of judicial reform. One core issue is whether all career judges should 
be selected through the mechanism of the Judicial Officer Exam conducted 
by the Examination Yuan, rather than chosen from the ranks of experienced 
lawyers, as in Anglo-American tradition.192 The concern is that young judges 
who have just graduated from law school, with limited social experience, may 
be unable to understand the complex cultural or social nature of facts and 
189. Ministry of Examination, Gongwu renyuan tezhong kaoshi sifaguan kaoshi, zhuanmen zhiye 
ji jishu renyuan gaodeng kaoshi lüshi kaoshi ge yingshi kemu mingti dagang (The guideline 
for designing the questions of the 2011 judicial exam and bar exam), available at http://wwwc.
moex.gov.tw/main/content/wHandMenuFile.ashx?menu_id=586&blnMulFiles=False.
190. Song, supra note 19, at 27.
191. Of course, because the pass rates of the two exams are fixed, the competitive pressure 
remains constant as well, regardless of the total number of exam takers in any given year.
192. In 1999, almost all leaders in the fields of law academia and practice participated in a Judicial 
Yuan judicial reform conference. One important consensus reached at the conference was 
to combine the current separate examinations into one. On the issue of how judges should 
be selected, 60 participants favored choosing them only from prosecutors, lawyers and 
law scholars rather than through examination, and 55 participants opposed. On training 
prospective judicial officers and lawyers, 26 participants were in favor of “one examination, 
separated training systems,” while 89 participants supported the idea of “one examination, 
one training system.” See Tay-sheng Wang, Faguan Yu Jianchaguan Jhih Cyucai Yu Syunlian 
(the Selecting and Training of Judges and Prosecutors), in Sihfagaige Shihhuounian De 
Heigu Yu Jhanwang (The Tenth Anniversary National Conference on Judicial Reform: 
Retrospect and Prospect), at 546, 546–47 (Dennis Te-chung Tand & Kuo-chang Huan eds., 
2010) [hereinafter Wang, Selecting and Training].
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arguments in disputes. A 1989 law permits lawyers and law professors who 
have been practicing or teaching for at least three years to apply to become 
judges—a measure that has not found much favor. Nonetheless, in 2002, the 
Judicial Yuan decided to select more new judges in this manner.193
According to the rules promulgated by the Judicial Yuan, there are 
three ways for a lawyer to become a judge.194 The first involves obtaining a 
recommendation from the Taiwan Bar Association.195 The second is through 
an annual Judicial Yuan written and oral examination.196 The third is by 
invitation from the Judicial Yuan task force that recommends lawyers who 
have practiced law for at least 14 years while demonstrating an outstanding 
reputation or making notable contributions to the legal profession.197 As of 
2009, 43 lawyers had been appointed judges by the first method and 19 lawyers 
through the second.198 Considering the heavy workload, the salary of a judge is 
not attractive to prestigious senior lawyers. As a result, no one has yet accepted 
the Judicial Yuan’s invitation to become a judge.199
Although these judges constitute only a small part of the judiciary, the 
Judicial Yuan has gradually established an alternative path for recruitment 
of new judges. This has provided the Judicial Yuan with greater power in 
selecting and training new judges. In addition, these prospective judges 
are not trained at the Judges and Prosecutors Training Institute within the 
Ministry of Justice, but at the Judicial Personnel Study Institute, an agency 
for continuing education of judges that is overseen by the Judicial Yuan.200 
Notably, this separates the training of judges from that of prosecutors.
On June 14, 2011, Taiwan’s Congress passed a controversial Judges Act, 
which had been in the making for 23 years.201 Although it had a lengthy 
gestation, the legislation was passed hastily in response to several events in 
2010 and 2011 that undermined public trust in the judicial system, including 
193. Sifayuan linxuan lushi, jiaoshou, fujiaoshou, jiangshi chongren fa yuan faguan shencha 
banfa (Regulation of selection of lawyers, professors, associate professors, and lecturers 
appointed to the Court as judges of Judicial Yuan) was promulgated on Sept. 9, 2002, and 
abolished Mar. 23, 2011, then replaced by Sifayuan linxuan lushi, jiaoshou, fujiaoshou, 
zhuli jiaoshou zhuan ren fa yuan faguan shencha banfa (Regulation of selection of 
lawyers, professors, associate professors, and assistant professors appointed to the 
Court as judges of Judicial Yuan) (2011) [hereinafter Court Appointment Regulation], 
available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0020152.
194. Id. at art. 4.
195. Id. at art. 5.
196. Id. at art. 8–10.
197. Id. at art. 11–13.
198. Wang, Selecting and Training, supra note 192, at 547.
199. Id.
200. Court Appointment Regulation, supra note 193, at art. 23.
201. See June Tsai, Legislature passes law for removing Taiwan judges, Taiwan Today, June 15, 
2011, available at http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=167912&ctNode=413.
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acquittals of alleged child molesters and several scandals involving alleged 
unethical conduct by judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court.202 
One major purpose of the new law was to remove incompetent judges.203 To 
ensure that newly appointed “baby” judges with little social experience did not 
become arrogant “dinosaur” judges living in an ivory tower, Congress made a 
resolution asking that ten years after enactment of the Judge Act, fewer than 
20 percent of newly appointed judges should be selected from those who pass 
the test administered by the Examination Yuan.204 Other new judges must 
be selected from other sources, such as from lawyers who have practiced law 
for at least three years.205 To encourage selecting judges from experienced law 
professionals, the Judges Act authorizes the Judicial Selection Committee to 
make these decisions.206 The committee is to be headed by the president of the 
Judicial Yuan and to include two representatives of the Examination Yuan, 
six individuals representing judges, one prosecutorial representative, three 
representatives of lawyers and six scholars or impartial members of society.207
Although these congressional solutions are not binding, they represent 
the view of Congress that people with little social experience beyond time 
spent studying at cram school are qualified to become judges and prosecutors. 
Implicit in these actions is that the current two national examinations 
for lawyers, prosecutors, and judges will not be combined into one, as has 
happened in Japan and Korea. Conversely, the paths of examination and 
training probably will be further separated, with the bar exam adopted as the 
first exam for all graduates of law schools.
202. For detailed information regarding these unethical events, see Zach Zagger, Taiwan passes 
controversial new law to remove judges, Jurist, Paper Chase Column, June 15, 2011, available 
at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/06/taiwan-passes-controversial-new-law-to-remove-
judges.php. Some commentators correctly pointed out that these high-profile incidents 
involving Taiwan’s judges are the result of defects in legal education in Taiwan. See Lin 
Chih-Chieh, Taiwan’s Judicial Reform Starts with Education, Taiwan Today, Apr. 22, 2011, 
available at http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=161203&ctNode=413.
203. Wendy Zeldin, Taiwan: Law on Removal of Judges Adopted, But Dinosaur Judges Might 
Not Become Extinct, Law Library of Congress, News & Events, Jul. 6, 2011, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402737_text.
204. See Legislation Yuan, Lifayuan gongbao (Legislative Yuan Report), N. 100, No. 49, p. 2229, 
available at http://lis.ly.gov.tw/ttscgi/lgimg?@1004905;2228;2230.
205. Id.
206. See Zeldin, supra note 203.
207. Id. Another congressional solution asks that the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and 
the Administration Yuan together prepare a report on the feasibility of new rules for the 
recruitment of judges and prosecutors within three years following enactment of the act. 
The new rules should separate the recruitment of judges and prosecutors into two stages. 
Law graduates who pass the first stage of the judicial exam must have at least three years of 
work experience before taking the secondary stage of the exam. Examinees who pass the first 
stage but fail in the second stage are still eligible to obtain a lawyer’s license. See Legislation 
Yuan, supra note 204, at 2229. Since a congressional solution has no binding effect, whether 
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Two developments are likely to reinforce this trend. On the one hand, 
because government budgets limit the number of new judges and prosecutors, 
the judicial exam has admitted fewer test-takers each year. In 2011, only 70 
examinees were accepted,208 the lowest number in two decades. On the other 
hand, more lawyers join the legal profession every year, greatly increasing 
competition in the legal services market. Meanwhile, the global economic 
recession has meant that fewer clients can afford high attorney fees. As a 
result, an increased number of lawyers are now interested in changing careers 
to what they consider more secure jobs as judges or prosecutors. If these 
trends continue, passing the bar exam will no longer guarantee a respectable 
job. Because undergraduate law programs are not necessarily able to provide 
students with the skills required to survive in a competitive market, more 
students might consider earning a master’s degree before entering the job 
market. Therefore, although Taiwan does not require a master’s degree to 
practice law, as Japan and Korea do, it is likely to become a de facto condition. 
The only question is whether graduate institutes in Taiwan will recognize this 
trend and redesign their curriculums accordingly.
VI. Conclusion
Under the impact of globalization, many countries have amended their 
legal education systems to produce professionals capable of meeting the 
challenge of severe market competition. The radical reforms to legal education 
in Japan and Korea have stimulated debate in Taiwan about whether to adopt 
similar changes and spurred a number of governmental initiatives. Although 
attempts at similar reform failed in Taiwan, the adjusted system shares many 
of the characteristics with the Japanese and Korean reforms. Law schools in 
all three countries still admit students from the undergraduate level, even after 
establishing professional programs at the graduate level. Graduate programs 
are available in each of these countries, admitting both law and non-law 
graduates. One goal of the original plans was to make non-law graduates the 
major group of law students. Students with an undergraduate law background, 
however, still are the majority in graduate programs. As in Japan, a number 
of Taiwanese universities offer both undergraduate and graduate programs. 
Other universities offer only one type of law program, as in the Korean model. 
Although a graduate degree is not required to practice law, a master’s degree 
in law has become popular among new legal professionals in Taiwan. These 
characteristics do not exist in the American system, but might be necessary for 
Asian countries in which English is not an official language. These changes 
have developed differently in the three countries—but the systems may share 
more similarities than differences.
The separation of admission exams for judges, prosecutors and lawyers 
in Taiwan has made it easier to increase the number of individuals passing 
208. Ministry of Examination, Yibainian gongwu renyuan tezhong kaoshi sifaguan kaoshi 
diyishi baokao renshu ji luqu huo jige lü an leike fen (Statistics of the number of applicants 
and the passing rate for the 2011 judicial exam), available at http://wwwc.moex.gov.tw/main/
ExamReport/wHandStatisticsFile.ashx?StaticticsID=1190&blnMulFiles=False. 
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the bar exam, at the cost of reduced pre-practice training. Among all types of 
educational institutions, only graduate programs are capable of narrowing the 
gap between theoretical teaching and legal practice. However, for graduate 
programs to fulfill this mission, several important issues that have not been 
recognized must be examined seriously. These issues include the means to 
expand the faculty, flexible tuition policies and the eligibility of full-time law 
faculty to practice law. In addition, the framework of the national admission 
exams is becoming more similar to that abandoned by Japan. This can hardly 
be called progress. These key considerations are not yet central issues in 
Taiwan. If policy makers refuse to address them, however, Taiwanese legal 
professionals will be at a disadvantage when they compete with Japanese and 
Korean lawyers, with negative economic consequences and a retarding effect 
on essential judicial reform.
